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Draft Recommendation 
on European security: crisis-prevention and management 
The Assembly, 
( i) Deploring the powerlessness of the European institutions to avoid the outbreak of a bloody war bet-
ween the components of former Yugoslavia and their inability to find joint ways and means of bringing it 
to an end; 
(ii) Stressing the urgency of implementing co-ordinated operational mechanisms between the United 
Nations, the CSCE, NATO, the European Union and WEU capable of preventing conflicts and managing 
future crises constituting a threat to peace and security; 
(iii) Stressing that any measures to maintain and re-establish peace in any region where it is threatened 
must be authorised by the United Nations; 
( iv) Stressing also that reliance should be placed on the crisis-prevention mechanisms of the CSCE; 
(v) Welcoming paragraph 1 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 549 and paragraph 6 of its 
reply to Recommendation 548 recognising the need to develop joint assessment of risks and threats; 
(vi) Recalling nevertheless that the Assembly does not make "suggestions" to the Council but recom-
mendations that have been formally adopted; 
(vii) Noting with interest the work of the Council on: 
- WEU's role in peace-keeping; 
- anti-missile defence; 
- intelligence policy; 
-missions by WEU forces in humanitarian aid, peace-keeping and restoring peace; 
- WEU policy on exercises; 
- the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty; 
- progress in the feasibility study for a WEU space-based observation system; 
- air and naval co-operation in WEU; 
(viii) Wishing sincerely that these studies will rapidly lead to actions that will make WEU truly opera-
tional in crisis-prevention and management; 
(ix) Perturbed nevertheless by information received from the Council to the effect that most of the WEU 
member countries have responded negatively to the request to make troops available to protect the safe 
areas in former Yugoslavia; 
(x) Consequently recalling the wide-ranging obligations placed on all the member countries under the 
modified Brussels Treaty to preserve peace and security; 
(xi) Believing that a fully operational WEU will be capable in future of preventing the development of 
a conflict such as that in former Yugoslavia, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Make a regular assessment of risks and threats in the world liable to affect peace and security and 
draw the consequences therefrom for Europe; 
2. Take an initiative in the context of the common foreign and security policy to define a crisis-preven-
tion and management policy taking account of the lessons drawn from the crisis in former Yugoslavia; 
3. Inform the Assembly of the results of the work on "mutually reinforcing institutions" carried out by 
the CFSP working group on security and of the Council's own contribution to this study; 
4. Play an active part in the conference on the pact for stability in Europe, by offering its good offices, 
in the framework of this conference, to the associate partners of WEU and future associate partners, insis-
ting in particular on the principle of the inviolability of present frontiers; 
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5. Establish a permanent dialogue with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on 
crisis-prevention and management; 
6. Complete the development of the measures referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9 of Recommendation 
556 necessary for WEU to become fully operational in the framework of crisis-management and relating 
to: 
- the space-based observation system; 
- strategic means of transport; 
- the European corps and the European air and naval force and other forces answerable to WEU so 
as to enable a European rapid action force to be created; 
- armaments co-operation; 
- interaction between the chiefs of defence staffs, military representatives, the Planning Cell and the 
WEU Secretariat-General; 
7. Co-ordinate with NATO the means available and the sharing of responsibilities in crisis-manage-
ment, particularly in the area of restoring peace; 
8. Establish direct co-ordination with the United Nations and the CSCE with a view to permanent 
representation in these two organisations; 
9. Take the necessary steps to ensure that, in the event of a given crisis, member states increase their 
efforts to seek the necessary political consensus; 
10. Pursue its dialogue with the Maghreb countries and with Egypt and keep the Assembly informed; 
11. Establish a dialogue with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN); 
12. Contribute to the repatriation of foreigners obliged to leave Yemen on account of the civil war . 
., 
3 
DOCUMENT 1418 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Paradoxically, all who fervently hoped that, 
with the end of East-West confrontation and the 
(conventional and nuclear) arms race between the 
two alliances led by the United States and the 
Soviet Union, a lasting peace would emerge under 
the rule of law and a new world order were mis-
taken. On the contrary, innumerable disputes, 
conflicts and tensions have arisen in many parts of 
the world, but also in Europe itself. The situation 
is such that people are already referring to world 
disorder and the notion of peace-keeping has 
already become a far more topical term than was 
the case during the cold war period. 
2. The ambitions of Western European coun-
tries to see Europe become a prime factor of sta-
bility, security and peace in the world, capable, if 
necessary, of "exporting" security to other regions 
of the world, have practically collapsed in the 
light of the total failure resulting from their inca-
pacity to reach agreement on a policy for avoiding 
the bloody conflict that has raged in the past three 
years among the peoples of former Yugoslavia 
and subsequently putting an end to continuing 
hostilities in the immediate vicinity. 
3. Preventing crises, assuring international 
peace and security, opposing all policies of 
aggression, defending basic human rights, demo-
cratic principles, civil and individual liberties and 
the rule of law: such were the principles on which 
the countries of Western Europe were founded 
almost forty years ago as a result of their conclu-
ding a treaty of legitimate collective defence 
which bound them not only to accept responsibil-
ity for security and peace in Europe itself, but also 
to react to any situation that might constitute a 
threat to peace in whichever part of the world this 
might arise. In the present situation the question 
must therefore be asked as to how and by what 
means Western European Union and its member 
countries are fulfilling their wide-ranging obliga-
tions under the treaty which attributes heavy res-
ponsibilities to all the member states in the WEU 
Council. 
II. The activities of the WEU Council 
4. With the exception of an allusion to the 
situation in former Yugoslavia, a study of the 
declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers 
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issued in Luxembourg on 22nd November last 
reveals no specific mention of the existence of 
dangers or conflicts in the world likely to affect 
the security of Europe. On the subject of the crisis 
in the Balkans the WEU Council merely refers to 
the conclusions already reached by the Council of 
Ministers of the Twelve, which met immediately 
prior to the WEU Council and to which meeting 
the WEU Secretary-General was not even invited. 
Moreover the Ministers hailed the progress of 
democracy in the countries of the former Soviet 
Union, stressing the importance of the parliamen-
tary elections in Russia and Ukraine. In conclusion 
the declaration contained a brief reference to the 
Council's contacts with the Maghreb countries. 
5. The declaration issued after the NATO 
summit meeting on lOth January 1994 on the 
other hand identifies certain causes of instability, 
tension and conflict by referring specifically to 
the dangers arising from the proliferation of wea-
pons of mass destruction and their means of deli-
very which, according to NATO, constitute not 
simply a risk, but a "threat to international secur-
ity". It mentions also, as giving cause for concern: 
international terrorism, the denuclearisation of 
Ukraine, the situation in the southern Caucasus 
and that in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
Although it certainly does not provide a complete 
and systematic assessment of the risks and threats 
that could affect world security and particularly 
security in Europe, the NATO summit meeting 
declaration at least has the merit of drawing the 
attention of public opinion to several specific pro-
blems and risks. 
6. The last WEU ministerial meeting in 
Luxembourg was given over in large part to exa-
mining WED's role after the entry into force of the 
Maastricht Treaty and its contribution to the 
NATO summit meeting, but with the aim of per-
suading public opinion of the essential nature of 
the projects WEU was striving to achieve, in par-
ticular in the areas of peace-keeping and crisis-
management. WED's Luxembourg declaration 
would certainly have been much more convin-
cing, however, if it had included a general assess-
ment of the dangers to peace and security in 
Europe, which, under the organisation's treaty, it is 
WED's primary task to safeguard. In the absence 
of such an assessment, the impression is increa-
singly conveyed that WEU has indeed abandoned 
the exercise of its basic responsibilities to the 
authorities of the Atlantic Alliance or the Euro-
pean Union. 
7. Certain signs however seem to indicate that 
the Council and its subsidiary organs are taking a 
considerable number of initiatives on which it is 
reluctant to provide information if not expressly 
requested to do so. Thus it emerges from the 
Council's reply to Recommendation 549 on politi-
cal relations between the United Nations and 
WEU and their consequences for the development 
ofWEU: 
" ... that the Chiefs of Defence Staff, basing 
themselves on an initial report by the 
Defence Representatives Group on the 
European security implications of military 
changes in the former Soviet Union, have 
proposed that the scope of this study be 
extended. 
The DRG has had an exchange of views on 
a French contribution entitled "Study of cri-
sis areas on Europe's periphery", the main 
conclusions being that to take into account 
those factors of more specific concern to 
the security of Europe - and in particular 
the role of WEU- WEU must now analyse 
in detail: 
- the risks of a crisis in the area of the 
member countries of the Forum of 
Consultation; 
- the instability and risks existing in the 
countries bordering the member, associ-
ate or observer states; 
- the overall problem of security in the 
Mediterranean. 
The practicalities and appropriate methodo-
logy for this work is on the DRG's agenda." 
It is clear that the Assembly is very interested to 
know the outcome of these discussions. 
8. Moreover, in its reply to Recommendation 
548 on WED's relations with Central and Eastern 
European countries by which it invited the Forum 
of Consultation inter alia to undertake "the joint 
elaboration of risk and threat assessment" the 
Council undertook a commitment vis-a-vis the 
Assembly and reserved the option of placing "the 
joint elaboration of risk and threat assessment" on 
the agenda of the Counsellors' Group of the 
Forum of Consultation. 
9. As to the conflict in former Yugoslavia, 
WEU had developed contingency plans in parti-
cular with regard to the possible creation of safe 
areas; these plans had been transmitted to the Uni-
ted Nations and the CSCE but without any practi-
cal action being taken upon them. WED's current 
role in this area is confmed to continued opera-
tions in relation to the embargo on the Danube, 
Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic and to len-
ding support, at the request of the ministers of the 
European Union, to the administration of Mostar 
5 
DOCUMENT 1418 
with a view to organiSing a police force and 
improving certain essential logistic functions, 
especially in the medical field. However, it 
appears that WED's contribution in this connec-
tion is still in its study phase. 
10. The second part of the Council's thirty-
ninth annual report to the Assembly ' states that 
the Planning Cell has undertaken various work 
and studies in crisis-management which are wor-
thy of note. These consist specifically of: 
"Studies on possible WEU participation in 
former Yugoslavia: at the Council meeting 
on 6th July 1993, the Planning Cell was tas-
ked to study the possibility of participation 
of the WEU member countries in the pro-
tection of safe areas. For that, a question-
naire was submitted to nations in order to 
fmd out which forces nations might be 
willing to provide. Most of the answers 
received were negative." 
11. In point of fact, such a result requires seve-
ral urgent clarifications: if the majority of member 
countries are not ready to make forces available 
for the protection of safe areas in former Yugo-
slavia, it should come as no suprise that WEU 
and the whole of Western Europe are being increas-
ingly marginalised in the management of this crisis. 
12. What use is served therefore by the research 
into the role of WEU in peace-keeping that the 
Special Working Group has undertaken on the 
basis of a study document initiated by the Italian 
Delegation? It emerges from the last annual report 
of the Council that a document on this subject was 
submitted as a report from the Chairmanship-in-
Office to the ministers of WEU who took note. 
But what was the outcome? 
13. The last annual report of the Council also 
reveals that a major study is in progress on "mis-
sions for WEU forces in the areas of humanita-
rian, peace-keeping and peace-making opera-
tions." If, as the annual report states, the Planning 
Cell has already prepared preliminary projects for 
the first two types of mission, it is imperative to 
ensure that everything is done to develop them to 
the full and that the Assembly is informed of this. 
14. The document on intelligence policy prepa-
red by the Group of Representatives of the Defen-
ce Ministers with the assistance of the Planning 
Cell should also be noted, given that intelligence 
is an essential tool in crisis-prevention. Similarly, 
it is most welcome to learn that the work of the 
Open Skies Group has progressed substantially. 
According to the annual report of the Council, 
approaches have been made to third parties with a 
view to their accession to an initial series of ope-
rational rules for a cluster of joint observation 
1. Document 1411, 5th Aprill994. 
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systems within the framework of WEU. It is to be 
hoped that work on the feasibility of the WEU 
European space-based observation system will 
yield definitive results this year. 
15. In particular the fact should be welcomed 
that the annual report refers to in-depth considera-
tion of European thinking on anti-missile defence 
in the framework of the activities of the Special 
Working Group of the Council. It was, in part, the 
symposium organised by the Assembly in Rome 
in March 1993 which led to the Council's taking 
the following decision: 
"Given the change of direction in American 
government policy, it was decided to stop 
using the term "GPS" in SWG documents 
and to take over the term "anti-missile 
defence" used by the Assembly. The group 
agreed that WEU should concentrate on the 
defence aspects, having regard to the work 
carried out in other bodies on non-prolife-
ration. The group decided initially to 
recommend to the Council that a meeting 
of experts be held to prepare a risk analysis. 
The resulting document would then be sub-
mitted to the Special Working Group." 
16. In point of fact, the area of proliferation 
was where the competent organisations ought to 
show the greatest vigilance with a view to taking 
appropriate measures to prevent risks arising from 
the activities of certain countries in this connec-
tion becoming a threat. 
Ill. Real and potential risks 
to European security 
(a) The dangers of proliferation 
17. The dangers arising from the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and their means 
of delivery and from the nuclear programmes of 
certain countries which have not signed the non-
proliferation treaty or are not ready to submit their 
programmes to the scrutiny of the IAEA stem 
mainly from activities of China and North Korea 
as exporters of nuclear technology and ballistic 
missiles to the countries of the third world, among 
which India and Pakistan in particular are in the 
process of developing ambitious programmes for 
acquiring nuclear capability. Neither of the latter 
has as yet signed the nuclear non-proliferation 
treaty. 
18. Tension in the Korean peninsula remains 
high as a result of uncertainties over North 
Korea's intentions about seeking to acquire a 
nuclear capability, refusing to allow inspection of 
its installations by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), and threatening finally to 
withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty 
and from the Joint Amnesty Committee. For a 
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time North Korea was even on maximum alert. To 
strengthen protection of South Korea, American 
Patriot anti-missile missiles have been deployed 
in South Korea. Efforts to find a way forward out 
of a major crisis will depend not only on the evo-
lution of domestic policy in North Korea but also 
on China's policy within the United Nations Secu-
rity Council. However this is also primarily a 
diplomatic problem for the United States which 
North Korea still regards as its principal adver-
sary. Furthermore North Korea is one of the 
countries making major efforts to acquire ballistic 
missile capabilities and to export them. 
19. Regimes apparently hostile to the West, 
such as Iran, Iraq or Libya, are also customers for 
non-conventional technology from China, North 
Korea or Russia. To illustrate the justifications put 
forward by certain countries to explain their acti-
vities in nuclear weaponry, suffice it to recall that 
in India, the former chief of staff of the armed 
forces declared himself in favour of "minimum 
deterrence", based on missiles and nuclear arms, 
in order to discourage "American intimidation" 
and prevent "possible racist aggression" from the 
West 2• Europe's vulnerability in the face of risks 
from ballistic weapons acquired by "hostile" 
countries could be increased by the development 
of very low-altitude "poor man's cruise missiles", 
which are extremely difficult to detect. Iraq, Iran, 
North Korea, Indonesia and Pakistan are among 
the countries seeking to acquire such capabilities. 
20. More specifically as regards Iran, where 
the regime is considered to be unstable, the coun-
try has recently been suspected of supporting cer-
tain terrorist groups such as the IRA and of having 
supplied them with armaments - an allegation 
which the Iranian authorities have nonetheless 
categorically denied. Rumour also has it that the 
Iranian authorities have financed Islamic terrorist 
groups in Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, 
Israel and in the Maghreb countries 3• 
21. Alongside these dangers is also that of 
clandestine proliferation of the nuclear techno-
logy and technical know-how of the former Soviet 
Union, even after the signature, on 14th January 
1994, of the trilateral agreement between the Uni-
ted States, Russia and Ukraine on the denucleari-
sation of the latter and the transfer of the Ukrai-
nian nuclear warheads to Russia for destruction. 
This agreement opens the way for Ukraine to 
become a signatory of the nuclear non-prolifera-
tion treaty, although this has yet to happen. 
22. The NATO summit took the decision t~­
"intensify and expand NATO's political and 
defence efforts against proliferation": the first 
based inter alia on a ten-point plan put forward on 
2. Le Figaro, 9th November 1993. 
3. The Times, 29th April1994\ 
15th December last by the German Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kinkel, and the second on a 
proposal by the American Defence Secretary, Mr. 
Aspin. The Kinkel plan is founded mainly on pre-
ventive measures and proposes that all countries 
sign the non-proliferation treaty and the conven-
tion on chemical and biological weapons, which 
still has to be supplemented by verification mea-
sures. 
23. It further provides for: 
-renewal, in 1995, of the nuclear non-pro-
liferation treaty for an indefinite term; 
- a strategy for the avoidance of nuclear 
contamination by regional confidence 
measures similar to those of the CSCE; 
- transplantation of the CSCE model to 
four other regions of the world where 
regional security forums should be crea-
ted; · 
- establishing international co-operation in 
controlling the exportation of armaments; 
- increasing fmancial resources available 
for eliminating weapons of mass destruc-
tion; 
- c:eation of a system of control for pluto-
mum; 
- conclusion of a comprehensive test ban 
treaty; 
- limitation of the measures of military 
coercion provided for under Chapter VU 
of the United Nations Charter solely to 
cases of serious threat to international 
peace and security. 
24. Mr. Aspin's proposals tended rather more in 
the direction of a "counter proliferation" initia-
tive, the first aim of which was to guarantee pro-
tection against the risk of attack from weapons of 
mass destruction, either by maintaining small 
nuclear arsenals and a system of protection 
against chemical and biological weapons or by 
acquiring the means to detect missile deployment, 
possibly by creating a tactical anti-missile system 
compatible with the provisions of the ABM treaty, 
and by strengthening the means of intelligence. 
25. It is clear that the two approaches- politi-
cal and military - in the struggle against the dan-
gers of proliferation fall squarely within WEU's 
areas of responsibility and expertise, and the 
Council cannot dissociate itself from them by lea-
ving the essential part of the discussion and pre-
paration of decisions to the authorities of the 
alliance or the European Union. It is therefore 
necessary to strengthen the position of the WEU 
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Secretary-General 4 who has recalled that Europe 
(and WEU) have experience and know-how 
appropriate to the creation of an early-warning 
and surveillance system and the development of 
appropriate defences. WEU should therefore, 
logically, consider the development of an ABM 
defence system as a continuation of its own space 
programme. However it should also make a major 
contribution to the political aspects of the issue. 
This relates particularly to armaments exports 
where common rules can be found only in a forum 
able to harmonise the defence interests of the 
various member countries. This forum is WEU, 
not the European Union. 
26. For one should not neglect the risks of a 
return to a conventional arms race in certain 
regions of the world. While the Twelve have so 
far been unable to agree on common rules on the 
exportation of dual-use equipment and arma-
ments, there has been a perceptible increase in 
exports from Russia, particularly to countries 
such as China, India, Iran, the United Arab Emi-
rates and Syria, and also to Turkey. With a view to 
restricting unauthorised exports, Russia has 
strengthened control over its sale of armaments 
abroad in order to offset the sharp fall in exports 
that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, it intends to offer much more advanta-
geous terms for the sale of arms to all CIS coun-
tries ready to join it in an economic union 5• More 
recently Russia signed a military co-operation 
agreement with Syria, opening up the possibility 
of resuming armaments sales to that country. In 
the past the Soviet Union was the principal sup-
plier of arms to Syria 6• 
(b) Regional tension and conflicts 
27. It should first be noted in the context of an 
assessment of the various loci of instability and 
conflict that have developed in the world since the 
end of the cold war that there are at least two 
conflicts in which NATO member countries are 
directly involved: one concerns Turkey (soon to 
become an associate member of WEU) and its 
Kurdish problem and the other Greece (member 
of the European Union and soon to be a full mem-
ber of WEU) and its quarrel over the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Also it must 
not be forgotten that Turkey and Greece are still 
opposed to one another in bilateral disputes, such 
as that over Cyprus, for which a fmal settlement 
has never been reached. So far, it has been pos-
sible for the WEU "family" to keep away from 
4. Speech to the Royal Institute for International Relations, 
Brussels, 27th January 1994. 
5. NZZ, 22nd February 1994. 
6. International Herald Tribune, 29th April1994. 
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domestic conflict and retain the unity essential to 
its role as a major factor of stability in Europe and 
the world; no effort should therefore be spared in 
avoiding bilateral conflicts between members and 
third countries that might jeopardise that unity. 
The example of the dispute between Greece and 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
clearly demonstrates how difficult this may prove, 
as members of the Presidential Committee were 
able to ascertain during their recent visit to 
Athens. 
28. With particular regard to Turkey, it should 
be recalled that the in-depth report submitted by 
Mr. Moya on behalf of the Political Committee on 
30th November 1992 7 did not fail to address the 
Kurdish question and the Turkish occupation of 
Northern Cyprus. On this latter issue it should be 
recalled that a joint communique was issued by 
the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers in Davos, 
on 1st February 1992, according to which both 
parties stated their common objective of quickly 
reaching a fair and lasting negotiated settlement 
on Cyprus. Also one should not forget the extre-
mely useful role of the Council of Europe which 
uses its influence and every means to ensure that 
Turkey conforms to the principles recognised by 
the European democratic community of which it 
intends to remain a member. 
29. In the case of Greece it is more specifically 
through the mechanisms of the European Union 
that disputes such as those between Greece and 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) can be resolved by diplomatic means 
rather than by force. 
30. The conflict in Bosnia and recent events in 
the town of Gorazde are again swelling the toll of 
victims - already numbering hundreds of thou-
sands - of the slaughter and violence, with no 
political or military solution yet in sight. There is 
a constant danger that the conflict may spread to 
neighbouring regions where the situation conti-
nues to be sensitive. In this context several new 
factors in the conflict should be borne in mind. 
Firstly Russia's increased involvement in this 
matter which has led to a heavy bilateral weigh-
ting in the management of the crisis in favour of 
the United States and Russia and the marginalisa-
tion not only of the United Nations but also the 
European institutions. Another factor is the Mus-
lim dimension of the conflict which threatens to 
cause a deterioration in relations between the Isla-
mic world and the West. 
31. Such a development could have extremely 
negative repercussions for crises and flashpoints 
in several regions of the Islamic world: in Kash-
7. Document 1341 and 1341 Addendum, 30th November 
1992. 
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mir, India, the border between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan and inside Egypt and Algeria. It is 
therefore increasingly important for the European 
Union and WEU to continue and intensify their 
dialogue with the Maghreb countries, indispen-
sable for security in the Mediterranean and also 
for the whole of Europe. 
32. With the prospect of links being strengthe-
ned between the Central European countries, the 
European Union and WEU in the near future, it 
should not be forgotten that bilateral differences 
persist between some of these countries - namely 
Hungary's dispute with Romania and Slovakia 
over their Hungarian minorities and also certain 
problems over minorities between Poland and 
Lithuania, which nevertheless seem to have been 
resolved recently, and between Romania and 
Ukraine. In the Baltic countries, there is still ten-
sion between Estonia and Russia both as regards 
the withdrawal of Russian troops and also the 
rights of the Russian-speaking populations and 
the border to the north and east of the town of 
Narva, as a result of differing interpretations by 
the two countries of the Tartu peace treaty signed 
in 1920. 
33. A large part of the problems between Lat-
via and Russia have been settled recently, in parti-
cular the complete withdrawal of the Russian 
troops which had been stationed in the country by 
31st August 1994. The two countries have agreed 
that Russia will maintain the anti-missile warning 
station at Skrunda for four years and on an arran-
gement for granting retired Russian soldiers the 
right to remain in Latvia. However Latvia is rais-
ing the issue of the interpretation of the Treaty of 
Riga on its borders with Russia signed in 1920. 
34. The differences between Lithuania and 
Russia principally relate to the problem of the 
major concentration of Russian troops in the Kali-
ningrad region. Russia still has the 14th army sta-
tioned in the Dnestr region in Moldova, despite 
efforts within the CSCE to encourage negotia-
tions for the complete withdrawal of the Russian 
troops. However Russia, which considers the pre-
sence of the 14th army as a stabilising factor in the 
region, seems in no hurry to move in this direc-
tion. 
35. In the context of the many conflicts raging 
in the territory of the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States (CIS) - in particular, the southern 
Caucasus region, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Nagorno-Karabakh; also the problems in Tajikis-
tan - Russia continues to demand priority in the 
settlement of these conflicts (for example it has 
demanded five military bases in the southern Cau-
casus, three in Georgia, one in Armenia and one in 
Azerbaijan 8• This should lead the United Nations 
8. Le Monde, 4th February 1994. 
and the CSCE, in particular, to insist that peace-
keeping and crisis-management missions should 
be carried out in these regions under the authority 
of these organisations and in accordance with the 
rules they have established. 
36. If Russia does not wish the notion of "near 
abroad", which includes the whole of the territory 
of the former Soviet Union, including that of the 
Baltic states, to be regarded as a new Brezhnev 
doctrine, it must clarify what it means exactly. 
This notion is worrying a number of the countries 
concerned, in particular Ukraine whose indepen-
dence has still not yet won universal acceptance. 
In this connection it should not be forgotten that 
some 25 million Russians live on "near abroad" 
territory and that Russian troops are stationed in 
Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Moldova, the 
Caucasus, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan. 
37. Moreover, the dispute between Russia and 
Ukraine on the division of the Black Sea Fleet is 
still not settled in spite of preliminary agreements 
reached in Moscow on 15th April 1994 between 
Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk which allocated 
80 to 85% of the fleet to Russia. 
38. On the settlement of conflicts on the terri-
tory of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), it should be noted that Russia, in a declara-
tion issued in Moscow on 29th March 1994, bear-
ing the joint signatures of the Russian Foreign 
and Defence Ministers, said that it would inform 
the United Nations and the CSCE of any peace-
keeping operations it undertook within the CIS 
but that it had no need of their permission 9• Nei-
ther the United Nations nor the CSCE nor the 
major western political leaders approved this atti-
tude. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Mr. Juppe, among others, stated that Russia 
should not undertake such operations without a 
formal decision by those international bodies, 
such as the United Nations or the CSCE 10, which 
have the competence and role to pronounce on 
such issues. 
39. Furthermore one has to ask what is the 
significance of the new Russian military doctrine 
which states that "Russia will not use its armed 
forces or its other troops against any state what-
soever except in individual or collective self-
defence, in the event of armed attack against the 
Russian Federation, its citizens, its territory, its 
armed forces, its other troops or its allies"? 
40. Similarly one can only wonder about Rus-
sia's intentions when it declares it reserves the 
right, under its military doctrine, to use nuclear 
weapons "in the event of joint action by a non-
nuclear state and one in possession of nuclear 
9. See full text of the declaration attached as an appendix. 
10. Le Monde, 31st March 1994. 
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weapons, which ... commit an act of aggression 
against ... its armed forces and its other troops, or 
against its allies". There are therefore several rea-
sons for wishing to maintain a permanent dia-
logue with Russia and to involve it in participa-
ting in the building of a collective security systell! 
so as to convince it that the outside world does not 
represent a danger to its security or legitimate 
interests; and also that a doctrine defending what 
were formerly known as "vital interests" can no 
longer have pride of place in modern international 
relations. A firm decision by Russia on participa-
tion in the NATO partnership for peace program-
me would be an important step towards reassuring 
the world that the fears recently expressed 11 that 
Russia's role in security policy was becoming less 
and less predictable are without foundation. 
41. The south-east Asia region is developing at 
an extremely rapid rate while much of its vast 
population remains in a state of dire poverty, thus 
giving rise to risks of conflict and dangers to 
peace which cannot be overlooked. A permanent 
dialogue between the European and Atlantic insti-
tutions with responsibility in security matters and 
the countries of south-east Asia, and in particular 
with the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), would therefore be most desirable, as 
this group has always been a factor of stability in 
the region. Such a dialogue, in which WEU 
should participate, could help to remind this 
group of states of the collective responsibility it 
must assume for maintaining peace and for non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
also to strengthen a reciprocal exchange of infor-
mation about all matters relating to security and 
defence policy. 
IV. Instruments for crisis-prevention 
and management 
42. The lessons of the war on the territory of 
former Yugoslavia have resulted in the common 
foreign and security policy bodies, at the initiative 
of France, taking an important measure in terms 
of preventive diplomacy, which therefore does not 
concern the countries engaged in open conflict. 
Thus, on a proposal by the French Prime Minister, 
Mr. Balladur, the European Union's common 
foreign and security policy authorities called a 
conference in Paris on 26th and 27th May 1994 in 
order to conclude a stability pact in Europe, a spe-
cific aim of which is to settle the problem of 
minorities and strengthen the inviolability of fron-
tiers. This initiative is therefore initially addressed 
to the countries of Central Europe and the Baltic 
countries hoping in future to become members of 
the European Union and with which the Union 
11. See for example the address by Mr. van Eekelen in Bonn, 
13th Apri11994. 
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has concluded or negotiated agreements. The aim 
of the project is to facilitate rapprochement and 
co-operation by the aforementioned states with 
the Union by helping them to comply with the 
conditions of membership. 
43. The Union intends to invite to the "launch 
conference" the countries principally concerned 
by the initiative, the immediate neighbour coun-
tries of those countries, states likely to make a 
specific contribution to the development of the 
initiative, countries with an interest in the stabi-
lity of Europe by virtue of their defence commit-
ments and countries having association agree-
ments with the Union (Albania, Austria, Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Finland, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Norway, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the 
United States), also representatives of the interna-
tional organisations concerned by the initiative 
(CSCE, Council of Europe, WEU, NATO and the 
United Nations). Other states participating in the 
CSCE in agreement with this concept and these 
procedures are also to be invited as observers. 
44. The aim of this conference justifies the fact 
that it should be called at the initiative of the 
European Union. However, WEU should take an 
active part in it. It is to be hoped that a lasting 
solution will also be found to a number of 
conflicts between neighbours such as those refer-
red to in paragraphs 32 to 34 above. Once ratified, 
these agreements will be transmitted to the CSCE 
in their entirety for safe keeping. 
45. Indeed, the CSCE should be offered firm 
support because of its major functions in the area 
of preventive diplomacy and crisis-prevention. 
Clearly, the economic aspect of international co-
operation plays a highly significant role in crisis-
prevention and is an essential factor in encourag-
ing certain countries to participate in disarma-
ment, armaments control and non-proliferation 
agreements and in agreements limiting arma-
ments exports and also if one wishes them to be 
involved in various confidence-building mea-
sures. 
46. In this context the CSCE model has shown 
itself to be successful, since it has invariably taken 
economic aspects of security into account. The 
CSCE's activities in the area of preventive diplo-
macy have proved increasingly useful and effec-
tive in the various regions where its representa-
tives have been active, although public opinion 
has hardly been aware of this. The Political Com-
mittee's meeting in Vienna with the Secretary-
General of the CSCE has made a considerable 
contribution to improving its knowledge of the 
current missions of that organisation, particularly 
in the Baltic countries, former Yugoslavia and in 
the CIS countries. 
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47. However the CSCE can act only within the 
geographic limits of its fifty-three member states 
and it has no means of coercion. It cannot therefore 
exercise any influence on China or North Korea. 
48. The United Nations is the only organisation 
with such means of coercion, but, as several crisis 
situations have demonstrated, it is, on the one 
hand, required to operate in too many parts of the 
globe and, on the other, it lacks the military 
resources for crisis-management. The use of 
troops made available by member states raises 
difficulties with regard to areas of responsibility 
and command structures. Moreover, there is 
insufficient agreement between member countries 
of the United Nations and especially within the 
Security Council on the legal bases and conditions 
for using force to restore peace. 
49. Moreover, it is becoming urgent to defme 
more clearly the responsibilities and competencies 
assigned to the military units deployed in a given 
region of crisis on the basis of a precise political 
objective determined by common agreement 
among all the countries participating in the opera-
tion. In this context, it is extremely interesting to 
note that, according to the report presented by the 
German Government to the Bundestag on the evo-
lution of European integration between 1st July and 
31st December 1993, the CFSP Working Group on 
Security drafted a document on the basis of Ger-
man proposals on "mutually reinforcing institu-
tions" which defmes the criteria for better co-ordi-
nation between the United Nations, the CSCE, 
WEU, NATO and the Council of Europe as regards 
conflict-prevention and crisis-management. This 
document is to be revised in early 1994 before 
being submitted to the Council of Ministers. 
50. It would be desirable not only to be infor-
med of the result of this work but also to know to 
what extent WEU is taking part in it and what is 
its contribution. 
51. One way or another, it will prove increas-
ingly useful to draw on the means of military 
organisations such as NATO and, shortly, WEU, 
which are ready to act as necessary either at the 
request of the United Nations or at that of the 
CSCE. WEU in particular must speed up its 
implementation of the decisions taken at Peters-
berg, namely the establishment of units ready to 
participate in humanitarian and peace-keeping 
missions and also combat forces for crisis-mana-
gement and operations to restore peace. 
52. This is the essential condition for WEU's 
help being requested by the United Nations or the 
CSCE. According the Secretary-General of 
WEU 12, the latter might become involved in four 
types of peace-keeping operations: 
12. Speech to the Royal Institute for International Relations, 
Brussels, 27th January 1994. 
- WEU member countries might alone be 
invited to undertake operations in the 
event of their being better placed to do so 
than a wider European-Atlantic grouping; 
- WEU could undertake operations in close 
co-ordination with another organisation 
(eg. operation Sharp Guard with NATO); 
- it might constitute the operational com-
mand and control centre for missions in 
which non-member countries would also 
participate; 
- it might take on the task of harmonising 
contributions from its member states to a 
United Nations operation, which was 
unfortunately not the case for the Somalia 
operation in which forces from several 
WEU member countries participated 
without any co-ordination being provided 
within the framework of WEU. 
53. Still in the view of the Secretary-General of 
WEU, NATO would be the main player in the 
settlement of regional crises in Europe to which 
the United States was prepared to make a contri-
bution. In other cases, in the absence of substan-
tial United States participation, WEU might play 
a leading role in the area of peace-keeping and 
crisis-management, always within the framework 
of a United Nations mandate or in conformity 
with the Charter of that organisation. 
54. However all of this will remain purely 
hypothetical if WEU does not quickly establish 
and bring into operational service the forces it 
11 
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terms forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU). 
WEU must move from the study stage to that of 
decision-taking in order to achieve all the plans 
being prepared which were described in Chapter 
II, with particular regard to strategic mobil-
ity, intelligence work, verification, space-based 
observation of the earth; in short, it must become 
truly operational if it is not to be just as powerless 
in the event of another challenge like the Yugo-
slav one. 
V. Conclusions 
55. Up till now, when WEU has been the sub-
ject of discussion in political circles, in the media 
or in public opinion, reference has invariably been 
to its future role because its achievements, unde-
niable as they are, in certain specific areas are not 
yet substantial enough for politicians and public 
opinion to appreciate their full impact. Crisis-pre-
vention, and even more so crisis-management, are 
areas which are absolutely central to WEU com-
petency. However, WEU can play a credible and 
effective role in this area only if all the govern-
ments give a decisive political impetus to the 
achievement of the various projects to which the 
Council and its subsidiary organs are committed. 
While it is true that a major success is invariably 
essential to boost a feeling of self-worth, set-
backs such as that Europe has suffered in the case 
of the conflict in former Yugoslavia can equally 
be effective in encouraging people to pull together 
and unite in a supreme effort. 
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Joint statement by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
and the Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation 
Lately some foreign politicians and mass 
media as well as international fora have, on seve-
ral occasions, made allegations concerning the 
"ambiguity" of Russia's peace-making mission in 
a number of member countries of the Common-
wealth of Independent States. The thesis of "neo-
imperial ambitions" of Russia is gaining popular-
ity. Whatever form such reproaches take, their 
essence is invariably the same: under the guise of 
peace-making activities- and maybe even bypas-
sing universally recognised standards of interna-
tional law - Russia allegedly intensifies power 
pressure on her neighbours, trying to acquire a 
right to "interfere" in their domestic affairs. This 
is accompanied by arbitrary interpretation of facts 
and also by their - voluntary or not - distortion. 
The main argument of the advocates of 
such a vision of the Russian peace-making activi-
ties in neighbouring states is a thesis of supposedly 
"one-sided" assignment by Russia of her troops 
to unstable regions. Based on that thesis is a 
conclusion that the involvement of the world 
community in peace-keeping efforts aimed at 
unblocking conflicts in the territory of the former 
USSR should include monitoring the activities of 
Russia. 
We do not want to exaggerate the signifi-
cance of this policy in certain political and public 
circles both in the West and in the East. The lea-
ders of the majority of countries demonstrate a 
responsible and sensible approach recognising the 
realistic and positive role of Russia in containing 
and settling crisis situations. As to peace-making 
operations in the CIS countries, Russia favours a 
real establishment of a truer and more solid part-
nership based on equality, mutual trust and res-
pect, not stopping at mere declarations of intent. 
For these reasons we consider it timely to 
draw attention to a number of political, internatio-
nal and legal aspects of principle of Russia's parti-
cipation in peace-making activities in the CIS 
countries. 
Russia's actions are directed only at stop-
ping armed conflicts in a number of independent 
states, stabilising the situation there and creating 
conditions for lasting and durable settlement. We 
are proud that the presence of Russian peace-
making forces in "hot zones" prevented even 
more numerous victims among innocent civilians. 
Our efforts are being taken in the context of 
a dramatically serious economic and fmancial 
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situation in Russia itself; diverting considerable 
resources for peace-making purposes over the last 
ten months alone amounted to 26 billion roubles 
(though it is difficult to make an accurate calcula-
tion and one should take into account inadequate 
provision of our "peace-making forces" as compa-
red with the United Nations Blue Helmets). More 
than 15 000 Russian servicemen are stationed in 
hot spots in the CIS member states. 
Peace-making as such in the CIS countries 
is not "a purely Russian initiative". In all cases 
without exception our actions are carried out at 
the request and with the consent of the relevant 
states and conflicting sides. Peace-making troops 
are sent on the basis of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements which comply with the rules of inter-
national law. This completely agrees with the pro-
visions of the United Nations Charter, according 
to which a possibility of dealing with matters of 
peace-making on the basis of agreements of the 
states concerned not only is accepted but welco-
med (Article 52 of the United Nations Charter). 
The only exceptions are enforcement actions, 
which, according to Article 53 of the United 
Nations Charter, should be taken under the Secu-
rity Council's authority. But all current peace-
making operations on the territory of the former 
USSR do not fall under this provision, because 
they do not involve enforcement and are taken 
with the consent of all conflicting sides .. The Uni-
ted Nations and the CSCE are informed on these 
operations on a regular basis. 
Russia is consistently favouring the widest 
involvement of the United Nations and the CSCE 
in the settlement of conflicts in the CIS countries. 
There is no need, however, for any "permission" 
on the part of the United Nations and the CSCE to 
conduct peace-making operations in accordance 
with the abovementioned criteria, in which Russia 
and its neighbours take part. The operations are 
carried out on the basis of the sovereign rights of 
respective states enshrined in the United Nations 
Charter and do not require additional legitimisa-
tion. It is true, however, that the co-operation with 
the United Nations and the CSCE and their active 
and substantive support of Russia's and its neigh-
bours' peace-making efforts could really facilitate 
more effective and faster settlement of conflicts. 
This is what we stand for when we suggest that 
the United Nations and the CSCE should interact 
with the peace-making operations in the CIS 
countries in different forms, including sending of 
missions, observers, advisers, etc. Russia will be 
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ready to participate also in peace-making opera-
tions by the United Nations and the CSCE in the 
territory of the former USSR if the parties to any 
conflict ask those organisations to start such opera-
tions and if a decision on their carrying out is taken. 
Meanwhile, it has to be noted that the 
repeated appeals of the CIS countries for support 
from the United Nations and the CSCE (in parti-
cular in connection with conflicts in Abkhazia and 
Tajikistan) are still awaiting the appropriate reac-
tion. Therefore, the agreements between Russia 
and its neighbours as well as mechanisms created 
within the CIS remain major peace-making ins-
truments in this region. It is thanks to them that 
the tasks of maintaining there international peace 
and security that constitute an integral part of the 
global process of ensuring global stability are 
13 
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being solved. The international community must 
acknowledge this objective reality and proceed to 
a closer interaction with Russia and its neigh-
bours. This, by the way, would help all "those in 
doubt" see the "transparency" of the peace-
making operations and the groundlessness of sus-
picions in this respect. 
Being consistent in its efforts to ensure 
peace and stability around its frontiers and within 
the CIS, Russia does not intend to put obstacles in 
the way of others. We do not demand a special sta-
tus or an exclusive role for ourselves, nor do we 
elude our responsibility for the situation in this 
region of key importance to Russia. We are ready 
to co-operate meaningfully in those questions 
with the United Nations, the CSCE and the inter-
national community at large. 
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